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Abstract
In Natural Goodness, Philippa Foot aims to give an account of goodness and
badness in action in terms of natural goodness and defect. In this paper I argue that
Foot’s account of natural goodness fails as an attempt to ground the evaluation of
living things in their life forms, even before its extension to moral evaluation. Foot’s
overall project depends on her characterization of a life form, and she gives an
account of life forms in terms of a theory of biological teleology. Teleological
propositions, for Foot, give an answer to the question “What part does it play in the
life cycle of things of the species S?” Foot’s biological teleology holds that the
features and behaviors of nonhuman organisms are all aimed at the ends of
characteristic development, self‐maintenance, and reproduction. However, there
are alternative theories of biological teleology from an evolutionary perspective.
From this perspective, germ‐line gene replication is the end towards which the
functions of living things are aimed. I argue that given the fact that Foot’s teleology
is not the only available theory, she faces a dilemma. She may either hold that her
account is preferable biologically speaking, and that teleological notions in
evolutionary biology are mistaken, or she may hold that her account of teleology is
compatible with those in biology since each is concerned with very different tasks.
Along with William FitzPatrick, I call the former the “exclusive approach,” and the
latter the “complementary approach.” I argue that the exclusive approach fails on
biological grounds. Against the complementary approach, I focus on worries about
the ways Foot might understand the life form and life cycle if her teleology is not
taken as a theory drawing on empirical science. I find that neither an exclusive
approach nor a complementary approach will yield a theory of teleology sufficient
for defending Foot’s claims about the basis of natural evaluation.
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Does Foot Have a Leg to Stand On?: A Dilemma for an Attempt to Ground Evaluative
Judgment in Biological Teleology
I. Introduction
In Natural Goodness, Philippa Foot’s task is to isolate a particular logical
category of evaluation and argue that moral evaluation falls under this category.
She aims to give an account of goodness and badness in action, and she does this by
relating it to what she calls natural goodness. Natural goodness is attributable only
to living things and their features, and is “intrinsic” in that it does not depend on the
needs or interests of members of any other species. It depends only on the relation
of an individual to its life form.1 Foot argues that moral evaluation and the
evaluation of nonhuman organisms in relation to their life forms share a logical
structure. She makes this argument by first giving an account of natural goodness
and defect in plants and nonhuman animals. She then extends this account, with
relevant modification, to human action. The only difference between the account of
evaluation of nonhuman organisms and humans is the characterization of their life
cycles. For plants and animals, the life cycle consists roughly in self‐maintenance
and reproduction. For humans, the life cycle also includes practical rationality.
I will argue that Foot’s account of natural goodness fails as an attempt to
ground the evaluation of living things in natural fact, even before its extension to
moral evaluation. Much of Foot’s overall project depends on her characterization of
a life form and of the life cycles of organisms. Without a principled explanation of
the life form and life cycle, Foot’s account of natural evaluation can support almost
Foot, Thompson and others often use the term ‘species’ when they mean it in the special sense of
‘life form,’ and in order to avoid confusion with the biological notion of a species I will stick to life
form, especially since I will later consider some biological examples.

1
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any claims about goodness and badness. This is because the norms according to
which one judges an individual are derived from claims about life cycle of its life
form. Since the life cycle is the foundation for her argument, the things Foot has to
say about the activities that count as a life form’s life cycle are crucial to her overall
project.
Foot gives an account of life cycles in terms of a theory of biological teleology.
Teleological propositions, for Foot, give an answer to the question “What part does
it play in the life cycle of things of the species S?”2 Foot’s account of biological
teleology holds that the features and behaviors of nonhuman organisms are all
aimed at the ends of characteristic development, self‐maintenance, and
reproduction. But here one might start to worry about the view. There are
alternative theories of biological teleology from an evolutionary perspective.3 From
this perspective germ‐line gene replication is the end towards which the functions
of living things are aimed. Evolutionary theories of teleology will certainly not yield
accounts of evaluation suitable for extension to moral philosophy. One reason to
think that evolution‐based teleology will not yield an acceptable account of moral
evaluation is that a tendency to neglect or mistreat step‐children, for example, may
have been an adaptation advantageous to the promotion of gene replication.
Evaluating attentive and loving step‐parents as morally defective is clearly
unsatisfactory. To save her account of natural goodness, Foot rejects evolutionarily
informed teleology.

2
3
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I will argue that Foot faces a dilemma, since her teleology is not the only
available theory. She may either claim that her account is preferable biologically
speaking, and that teleological notions in evolutionary biology are mistaken, or she
may claim that her account of teleology is compatible with those in biology since
each is concerned with very different tasks. Along with FitzPatrick, I call the former
the “exclusive approach,” and the latter the “complementary approach.”4
I will argue that the exclusive approach fails on biological grounds. First, I
will argue that Foot’s teleology cannot distinguish the genuine ends of features of
organisms from mere effects. I will discuss some biological examples from
FitzPatrick demonstrating that this is the case. These examples include dominance
hierarchies in elephant seals, parasitic flukes in snails, and the clutch size of swifts
in resource‐deprived environments. Foot’s teleology’s arbitrary focus on a subset of
teleological fact is the basis for another argument against the exclusive approach.
Since evolutionary informed teleological theories can explain more teleological facts
than can Foot’s, these theories are preferable to hers.
Against the complementary approach, I will focus on worries about the ways
Foot might understand the life form and life cycle if her teleology is not taken as a
theory competing with empirical science. I will suggest two options that seem
plausible, and argue that neither will save Foot’s account as a theory of natural
goodness grounded in natural fact. The first option is to understand life form‐
typical good as either the life cycle itself, or as success in the life cycle. This option
fails, I argue, because such an understanding either relies on something normative

4
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or an implausible account of what is good for a life form. The second option I
consider is that Foot looks to Michael Thompson to give an account of life form‐
typical good. This option fails because Foot has made claims that reach beyond
Thompson’s account in crucial ways. These extensions make Thompson’s analysis
of life form incompatible with Foot’s understanding of natural goodness.
In the end, I find that neither an exclusive approach nor a complementary
approach will yield a theory of teleology sufficient for defending Foot’s claims about
the basis of natural evaluation. And since her investigation fails even before it is
extended to discuss the vastly more complicated case of the evaluation of human
action, the prospects for Foot’s overall project do not look good. I focus on the
notion of a life form and that of a characteristic life cycle as the crucial elements of
Foot’s theory, and argue that these concepts just cannot do the work that Foot’s
account of natural goodness requires.

II. Foot’s Biological Teleology
As previously discussed, Foot’s project is to ground evaluative judgment in
comparisons between individual living things and their life forms. Her overarching
goal is to achieve an account that works for the moral evaluation of human agents.
She works at this by extending the structure she develops for the case of plants and
nonhuman animals and applying it to people. Since I will be arguing that her account
of evaluative judgment fails even before its extension to the human case, I will
summarize here how Foot grounds evaluative judgments of plants and nonhuman
animals.
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First, the goodness Foot is seeking to account for is ‘natural goodness.’
Natural goodness is the intrinsic, autonomous goodness that is attributable only to
living things themselves. The natural goodness and defect of living things is to be
contrasted with goodness and defect in artifacts and other nonliving things, and has
“nothing to do with the needs or wants of the members of any other species of living
thing.”5 On Foot’s view, the relation of a living individual to its species is a sufficient
condition for the existence of natural goodness and defect.
Foot’s account of objective, natural evaluation starts from Thompson’s
analysis of Aristotelian categoricals. Thompson notices that there is a form of
judgment that appropriately applies only to living things. One often hears
statements like “the bobcat breeds in spring,” or “the domestic cat has four legs.”6
He takes these statements, or Aristotelian categoricals, to have as “their canonical
expression sentences of the form ‘The S is (or has, or does) F’.”7 Having targeted
these expressions, he proceeds to argue that the Aristotelian categorical is a distinct
logical form of judgment.8
Thompson argues that the Aristotelian categorical cannot be reduced to
some other logical form of generalization by considering and ruling out plausible
reductions. “The S if F” cannot be reduced to “All S’s are F” since “cats are four
legged,” is true even if poor Tibbles only has three.9 “Most S’s are F” fares no better
as a reduction, since, “although ‘the mayfly’ breeds shortly before dying, most

Foot 26
Thompson 63
7 Thompson 64
8 Thompson 48
9 Foot 28
5
6
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mayflies die long before breeding.”10 And both Foot and Thompson argue that the
Aristotelian categorical “the S is F” captures something more than just the thought
that “some S’s are F,” even if it is true that this thought is entailed by the Aristotelian
categorical.11 I will come back to the thought that Aristotelian categoricals say more
than that some S’s are F when I discuss Foot’s argument against this.
Satisfied that he has picked out a distinct form of judgment, Thompson goes
on to explain life‐related concepts in terms of Aristotelian categoricals. He argues
that the concepts of life, life form, organism, life process, etc. can be explicated in
terms of a logical form of judgment. This logical form of judgment is an a priori
category of judgment. Of particular interest to Foot is the concept of a life form. A
life form is defined as whatever can be conceived through a concept that is fit to be
the subject of an Aristotelian categorical.12 Thompson argues that “it is not a merely
empirical fact, given that there are any organisms, that they fall under the particular
items we were calling ‘life forms’.”13 This is because in order to form an Aristotelian
categorical, one must already represent the life form. Any judgment of some
organism as alive presupposes the existence of its life form, and so the life form is
not discovered through empirical investigation.
Foot strays from Thompson’s account. She emphasizes the teleological
element in the life cycles of organisms. Genuine Aristotelian categoricals, for Foot,
must allow for answers to the teleological questions “What part does it play in the
life cycle of things of the species S?,” “What is its function?,” or “What good does it
Thompson 68
Foot 28
12 Thompson 48
13 Thompson 67
10
11
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do?.”14 She claims that the functions of traits and parts of plants and nonhuman
animals are all aimed, directly or indirectly, at an organism’s characteristic
development, self‐maintenance, and reproduction. This is because, at least for a
plant or nonhuman animal, the life cycle consists in these activities. What counts as
part of the life cycle of a life form is “that which is causally and teleologically related
to it.”15 So, for Foot, the functions of traits and parts of organisms are all related to
the ends of development, self‐maintenance, and reproduction. For example, “there
is an Aristotelian categorical about the species peacock to the effect that the male
peacock displays his brilliant tail in order to attract a female during the mating
season. The display serves this purpose.”16
The overall structure of Foot’s foundation for the evaluation of individuals is
this:
1. Life forms have characteristic successful life cycles. In plants and
animals, these life cycles consist in activities promoting development,
self‐maintenance, and reproduction.
2. There is a set of Aristotelian categoricals for each life form stating how,
for that life form, the life cycle is achieved.
3. From these Aristotelian categoricals, one can derive norms that apply to
the members of a life form.
4. Then, by applying these norms to individuals, one can evaluate the
individual with respect to its life form.
Step 1 is related to an organism’s good. An organism’s good, for Foot, consists in
success in a life cycle. By following this structure, Foot argues, one can reason from
judgments about what is good for a life form to judgments about the goodness of a
particular individual as a member of that life form.
Foot 32
Foot 31
16 Foot 31
14
15
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Foot maintains that she has shown, through this structure, that the norms
used to evaluate individuals “have been explained in terms of facts about things
belonging to the natural world.”17 She claims that the natural facts grounding the
explanation are facts about the life cycles of organisms. Any discussion of fact
immediately raises the question of how they are determined. One possible reading
may seem to suggest that Foot has empirical study in mind. For example, an
empirical investigation will show that the brightly colored tails of male peacocks
play a role in their characteristic reproduction.
There is, however, some complication here. Foot, like Thompson, claims that
statistical generalization and empirical study are not the basis of Aristotelian
categoricals. There is some basis for an Aristotelian categorical judging, for
example, that cats are four‐legged even after some horrible villain has removed one
leg from most cats on Earth. Foot discusses two arguments explaining why it is that
employing an Aristotelian categorical “S’s are F” is to do more than merely assert
that some S’s are F. First, she adverts to Thompson. Thompson argues that the
basis for Aristotelian categoricals is the natural history of the life form. Since, in the
natural history of cats, they characteristically have four legs, cats are four‐legged.
Secondly, she claims that Aristotelian categoricals are based on the teleology of a life
form, while statistical generalizations are not. An Aristotelian categorical stating
that cats are four‐legged says not only that some cats are four‐legged, but also that it
matters to the self‐maintenance and reproduction of cats that they have four legs.

17
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In this section, I have summarized the parts of Thompson’s analysis of life
and life form that are the basis of Foot’s account of natural goodness. I have also
argued that although she starts from Thompson’s general framework, Foot claims
that connecting Aristotelian categoricals to evaluative judgment requires going
further than Thompson. Both Thompson and Foot claim that evaluative judgment is
the product of the comparison of an individual organism to an Aristotelian
categorical about its life form. Genuine Aristotelian categoricals for Foot, however,
are only those judgments that have to do, directly or indirectly, with self‐
maintenance, development, or the reproduction of the individual. Foot thus
narrows Thompson’s view about what counts as ‘the life’ characteristic of a certain
life form.

III. The Dilemma
My main concern with Foot’s project is how to characterize the life cycles of
particular life forms. It is crucial for Foot’s account of the evaluation of individuals
that she be able to give some principled explanation of the inclusion and exclusion
of features and behaviors of organisms as parts of their life cycles. A principled
explanation is required because the life cycle is supposed to act as the basis from
which norms are derived. She claims that what plays a part in the life cycle of a life
form is “that which is causally and teleologically related to it,” and she has suggested
a biological teleology for plants and nonhuman animals concerned with organism‐
level development, self‐maintenance, and reproduction.18

18
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It is impossible to ignore, however, that Foot’s biological teleology is not the
only one on the scene. Neo‐Darwinian accounts of teleology based on gene
propagation through generations seem to have a strong foothold, at least in the
biological sciences. This fact suggests that Foot is faced with a dilemma, where she
may take one of two approaches: the exclusive approach or the complementary
approach. Taking the exclusive approach would amount to claiming that her own
account of organism‐level teleology is the only correct one. This puts her view in
direct competition with neo‐Darwinian teleological notions. Taking the
complementary approach, on the other hand, would be “to insist that there are two
different kinds of natural teleology associated with living things.”19 The
complementary approach maintains that while biologists correctly employ neo‐
Darwinian teleological concepts, organisms also admit of an entirely separate, but
equally objective, teleology.
In setting up my criticism of Foot as a dilemma, I hope to be able to canvass
the assortment of problems her account may face. And since Natural Goodness
covers biological teleology very generally and in just twenty‐five pages, Foot leaves
some room for speculation about her likely response to more specific questions.
The dilemma format, I hope, will allow me to investigate a broad range of Foot’s
possible positions on the specific issues and, in doing this, come to see the most
plausible responses available to her. Alas, I will argue in the end that even the most
plausible answers I find to questions posed to Foot about biological teleology and
the life cycles of organisms leave something to be desired.

19
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Responses to Foot in the literature seem to fall into one of two clusters: They
either assume that Foot has the exclusive approach in mind, and that objections
from evolutionary biology are therefore warranted, or that Foot has the
complementary approach in mind, and that therefore the philosophers in the first
cluster are gravely mistaken.20 The second group is, as far as I can tell, much
smaller. Arguments from the first cluster make up an essential part of the literature
criticizing Foot, and I will discuss what I consider to be the most persuasive
arguments against the exclusive approach. I find that consideration of these
arguments against the exclusive approach is important to a comprehensive
understanding of Foot’s position. In the end, given that one wants to apply the most
charitable interpretation possible, the most these arguments can accomplish is to
point out reasons to think that Foot must actually have the complementary
approach in mind. So, I will also present some worries for the complementary
approach. In either case, I will argue that Foot cannot provide a satisfactory account
of the life cycles of organisms, and that as a consequence her attempt at a
foundation for evaluation fails.

IV. Problems for the Exclusive Approach
One line of argument against Foot’s account of teleology comes from the
perspective of evolutionary biology. Arguments of this type assume that Foot means
to give an account of teleology that is in direct competition with those in
evolutionary biology, and that she is therefore taking what I have called the
For examples of the first group, see FitzPatrick, Woodcock, and Copp and Sobel. For the second
group, see Hacker‐Wright.

20
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exclusive approach. I will discuss two of what I consider to be the most persuasive
of this line.
First, FitzPatrick argues that an approach to biological teleology focused on
the success of individuals is motivated by the claim that only such an approach can
distinguish genuine ends from mere effects.21 He argues that his system‐based
biological teleology gives a principled way to determine which functions and ends
may correctly be attributed to an organism. The system‐based account serves as an
attractive alternative to Foot’s theory because it can distinguish between ends and
mere effects. FitzPatrick also argues that Foot’s account cannot deal with certain
cases. Three biological examples including the clutch size of swifts, dominance
hierarchies in elephant seals, and parasitic flukes in snails help FitzPatrick
demonstrate his point. Aside from failing to provide intuitive answers in these
particular cases, Foot’s ahistorical account is problematic for three reasons. First,
there is no longer any principled reason to think that organism‐level welfare is the
most relevant. Second, teleological judgments cannot count as explanatory of the
traits in question. Third, it becomes difficult if not impossible to determine why
various ends are weighted as they are.
The second argument I consider claims that Foot is just focusing on a special
subset of the teleological facts, namely, those facts that also happen to increase
characteristic organism‐level welfare. But if this is the case, and an evolutionarily
informed approach to teleology can explain all the facts, then Foot’s account should

21
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be rejected. These two arguments demonstrate the problems Foot’s teleology faces
if she takes the exclusive approach.
Consider first the example of dominance hierarchies in elephant seals. Male
elephant seals fight in bloody battles in order to gain exclusive access to
reproductive females.22 Once a male has been defeated in a battle, he surrenders to
the dominant male. Female elephant seals refuse to reproduce with all but the
dominant male. Because this fighting is a characteristic part of elephant seal life,
Foot can plausibly be assumed to count dominance hierarchies as part of the life
cycle of elephant seals. Given this, we can ask what the function of the dominance
hierarchy is.
One answer open to Foot, suggests FitzPatrick, is that it “is how they keep
intra‐group fighting to a minimum…thereby avoiding a great deal of injury and
living more flourishing lives, perhaps even living longer and having more
offspring.”23 On its face, this answer does well since it makes the good of dominance
hierarchies dependent on their effects on the lives of individuals. The group‐level
effect of dominance hierarchies has a genuine function which is, on this Foot‐
inspired view, to support the survival and reproduction of the individual.
However, this interpretation of the function of dominance hierarchies is in
tension with the most plausible evolutionary explanation. From the evolutionary
point of view, dominance hierarchies likely have no function at all. They are merely
group‐level side effects of the gene‐propagation behavior of individuals. The group‐
level effect sprang up as a result of the differential genetic consequences of the
22
23
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behavioral traits that led some elephant seals to fight for control of a harem but
subordinate themselves if beaten. FitzPatrick argues that Foot’s account gives the
wrong result in the case of elephant seals—“the benefit appealed to is not an end
functionally served by the dominance hierarchy, but just a side‐effect of behaviors
that are manifested for very different reasons, and it explains nothing.”24 If one is
not convinced by this example that Foot’s account attributes a function to a trait that
is a mere side effect, FitzPatrick also discusses parasitic flukes and their host snails.
The flukes live inside a species of snail, and manipulate the snail’s shell‐
secreting cells. Parasitized snails are forced by the flukes to divert resources to
build thicker shells. In being parasitized, the snails become less optimal gene
replicators. For example, it may be the case that snails with thicker shells are less
able to reproduce as often or as successfully as unparasitized snails. What
FitzPatrick finds interesting about this case, however, is that although the parasites
make the snail deviate from its characteristic life and reproduction, it is also true
that the individual snail itself benefits at least in one way from the parasite. The
thicker shells of parasitized snails make it more likely that they will survive longer,
and so perhaps be better off. On Foot’s view, then, the function of the parasite is
improvement in snail life span. However, thicker shells and an improved snail life
span are clearly mere side‐effects of the activity of the parasite. This example is to
be contrasted with cases of genuine symbiosis, where the reason for which certain
behaviors between two species have been retained by evolution is their beneficial
effect (or lack of negative effect) on the gene propagation of both species. In cases of

24

FitzPatrick 204

Popoff 15
genuine symbiosis, it is plausible to say that a function of each member’s
contribution is to make its partner better off and, in turn, make itself better off.
Perhaps the most convincing of FitzPatrick’s examples against Foot’s
teleology is the reduction of the clutch size of swifts from 3 to 2 eggs in
environments where food is scarce. He considers the case where it is assumed that
environmental resources are not so scarce that the swift simply cannot produce 3
eggs rather than 2, but where some kind of “birth control” method is in place.25
Foot, in keeping with her ahistorical attribution of functions, might say that the
function of the “birth control” method is clearly to manage resources in times of
scarcity, or that this is how swifts, as members of their life form, meet their need to
conserve resources. The idea is that this cooperative behavior would be explained
in much the same way as cooperative hunting in wolves or the dances of honeybees.
If cooperative resource management is the function of clutch size reduction, then a
swift who did not reduce clutch size in the appropriate environments would be
defective.
FitzPatrick considers two possible evolutionary explanations of this “birth
control” method, and asks how these two explanations might affect Foot’s
attribution of resource conservation as its function. First, the “birth control”
method may have evolved through group selection, since a cooperative reduction in
clutch size in times of scarcity makes it less likely that the group will exhaust its
resources. Second, the “birth control” method may have evolved to maximize

25
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personal reproduction, since a reduction in clutch size may be necessary to
optimally distribute scarce resources among the individual’s offspring.
FitzPatrick argues that either one of these evolutionary explanations is
plausible and that study of the causal history of this behavior is required to
determine which is correct. If the first evolutionary story is correct, Foot’s claim
that function of the “birth control” is cooperative resource conservation is right. In
this case, she would correctly evaluate a non‐cooperative swift as defective.
However, if the second evolutionary story turns out to be correct, then the “birth
control” is a competitive reproductive strategy whose function is to maximize viable
offspring. In that case, a swift that could successfully have 3 eggs instead of 2, even
in environments with scarce resources, would not be defective at all. FitzPatrick’s
point is that, without looking to the evolutionary history, there is no way for Foot to
tell which teleological account is correct. This matters because, with the wrong
teleological account, Foot evaluates the behavior of swifts as defective when it is not.
So, the history of a trait is important to its teleology, even when we are considering
what is part of the life cycle of a life form.
FitzPatrick argues, through the examples discussed above, that Foot’s
ahistorical account cannot distinguish genuine functions and ends from mere
effects. There are several reasons to worry about the exclusive approach to a
teleology that does not look to the causal history of a life form. The first is related to
the level at which benefit matters.26 Although Foot holds that only characteristic
organism‐level success in survival and reproduction is genuinely teleological, on an

26
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ahistorical account success at other levels seems to be equally important. In
rejecting that the causal history of a life form plays a role in determining the
functions and ends of its features, Foot seems to lose any principled reason for
insisting on organism‐level teleology. Benefits to the maintenance and propagation
of a species, genus, local herd, or the ecosystem might also be the genuine ends
toward which features of organisms are aimed, given some properly configured
group selection hypothesis. On the other hand, an account of teleology informed by
evolutionary biology can explain at which level the benefit of a feature matters by
pointing to factors in its causal history.
Second, functional teleological judgment might be understood as a certain
kind of explanation.27 Teleology without the capacity to distinguish ends from mere
effects cannot provide genuine explanations of the traits and features in question.
Or, where it does provide a genuine explanation, this is entirely accidental. For
example, Foot’s ahistorical account might seem to work in certain cases, as when we
explain the male peacock’s having brilliant feathers by their contribution to helping
it attract a mate. But “why do snails harbor flukes?” is not explained in the relevant
sense by pointing out that they increase shell thickness, since harboring parasitic
flukes does not contribute to the snail’s characteristic survival or reproduction.
Genuine teleological explanation seems to depend on there being some principled
way to determine which effects are the result of functions, and which are mere side‐
effects. Without a method for making this distinction, Foot’s teleological judgments
are not explanatory in the way one would expect.

27
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A third reason to worry about an exclusive approach to Foot’s ahistorical
teleology is that not only does it fail to distinguish ends from effects, but also it
cannot explain the hierarchy of a life form’s ends. FitzPatrick raises questions like
‘why does personal survival count less than the survival of siblings in one species
but more in another?’ and ‘why does reproduction always count more than
survival?’ As Foot recognizes, some organisms promote the survival and
reproduction of their kin or even members of other species. But these behaviors are
weighted in different ways in different life forms. 28
In some species, for example, an individual will easily give up its life to help a sibling,
whereas in others this would happen only in comparatively rare circumstances, indicating
that the two ends (i.e. personal survival and sibling survival) have different priorities in the
teleological structures of the two species.

Foot could appeal to the different ways of life of the life forms to explain these
differences. But these ways of life are taken as given and fail to explain the inner
structure of ends within the life cycle. Only an appeal to history could begin to say
anything about why it is that certain ends are subordinated to others in a life form.
This structure, FitzPatrick argues, “is a normative matter, not simply a matter of
what actually happens for the most part, and is central to any real understanding of
the teleological facts. It is thus very unsatisfying for an account of function to have
nothing to say about this.”29
Another line of argument, aside from the worries that Foot’s teleology cannot
satisfactorily account for the difference between genuine ends and mere effects, is
that Foot’s teleology accounts for just a subset of all the teleological facts. This
objection amounts to rejecting the claim that Foot’s teleology exhausts the
28
29
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teleological facts. An approach to teleology where the only genuine teleological facts
are those that have to do directly or indirectly with organism‐level survival and
reproduction, it is argued, is less desirable than a theory that can explain all the
possible teleological facts. Copp and Sobel argue that30
there might be several competing standards for evaluating the natural goodness of members
of a given kind of living thing, even taking into consideration that we seek a standard of
evaluating them as members of that kind rather than in terms of how well they serve the
interests of some other living thing.

Perhaps, for animals, an evaluation of their natural goodness should be in terms of
their pleasure or lack of pain, for example. Organisms, even nonhuman organisms,
engage in activities not centered on their survival and reproduction. The worry is
that a focus on survival and reproduction just cannot be justified. Also, Foot’s
account might be thought to ignore the end of gene replication. At the same time, an
evolutionarily informed account of teleology that takes gene replication to be the
ultimate end of organisms can account for these functions as well as the functions
related to organism‐level survival and reproduction. So, FitzPatrick argues, we
should reject Foot’s teleology in favor of an evolutionary account.31
In this section, I have focused on arguments that have force against Foot’s
teleology if she takes the first horn of my dilemma, the exclusive approach. The first
of these arguments centers around the claim that Foot’s ahistorical teleology, by
focusing solely on organism‐level survival and reproduction, cannot adequately
distinguish between genuine ends and mere effects in certain cases. FitzPatrick
argues for this claim by considering three biological examples where he finds that
Foot’s account does not yield the results it should. Foot’s account either attributes a
30
31
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function to traits that he wants to say do not have one, or does not attribute a
function to traits that do. Not being able to distinguish ends and functions from
mere effects makes it impossible to determine whether organism‐level benefits are
what really matters for teleology, makes it the case that teleological judgments
cannot be explanatory, and makes it difficult to explain why a life form’s ends are
structured the way they are. I also discussed the argument claiming that since
evolutionarily informed accounts can deal with the teleological facts with which
Foot is concerned and also with others, evolutionary accounts of teleology are
preferable to Foot’s. These two lines of argument seem devastating against an
ahistorical exclusive approach to biological teleology. In themselves, these
arguments are not conclusive against Foot since she may also have the
complementary approach in mind. In the next section, I will argue that there are
reasons to think that even the complementary approach cannot save Foot’s
biological teleology.

V. Problems for the Complementary Approach
In the last section, I considered arguments aimed against a reading of Foot in
which she takes her teleology to be in competition with teleological notions in
evolutionary biology. I argued that these problems are devastating for the exclusive
approach. In this section, I will move on to consider the consequences for Foot’s
view if she takes the complementary approach. Even if Foot takes herself to be
presenting a view of teleological concepts compatible with those found in
evolutionary biology, her account faces some serious problems.
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Much of the literature against Foot’s account focuses on biological examples,
demonstrating that many hold that Foot must be taking the exclusive approach.32
However, there is good evidence that Foot in fact had something more like the
complementary approach in mind. First, given that evolutionary counter‐examples
are so numerous and persuasive, it is uncharitable to think that Foot really had the
exclusive approach in mind. Also, it is obvious that Foot was well aware of the
general principles of contemporary evolutionary biology. Embracing the exclusive
approach makes Foot look painfully old‐fashioned, scientifically speaking. Not to
mention that Foot makes it explicit that she does not have an evolutionary or
historically‐focused teleology in mind in two footnotes:
It is imperative that the word ‘function’ as used here is not confused with its use in
evolutionary biology…To say that some feature of a living thing is an adaptation is to place it
in the history of a species. To say that it has a function is to say that it has a certain place in
the life of the individuals that belong to that species at a certain time.33
We are not then interpreting it as a historical question, as ‘proper function’ is interpreted, for
instance, by Ruth Millikan in Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, chapter 1,
and as ‘function’ would generally be interpreted in evolutionary biology. As David Wiggins
says in Postscript 4 in Needs, Values, Truth, 353, ‘we really need to describe what morality
has become, a question on which evolutionary theory casts no particular light.34

So, although much has been written arguing that Foot’s account is untenable
scientifically speaking, she probably means to be working at a task distinct from the
tasks of evolutionary biologists.
Foot can avoid problems for the exclusive approach by maintaining an
approach where the teleological concepts associated with organism‐level self‐
maintenance and reproduction are taken to be separate from those employed in
evolutionary biology. Specifically, it now seems as though Foot can
FitzPatrick, Copp and Sobel, and Woodcock, for example.
Foot, Note 10, Pg. 32
34 Foot, Note 1, Pg. 40
32
33
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unproblematically argue from life form‐typical good to the evaluative goodness of
individuals. Starting from notions of characteristic successful life cycles, defined by
some standard set apart from evolutionary biology, one can reach judgments about
evaluative natural goodness or defect. The problem now, however, is that unless
Foot can give a positive naturalistic account of life form‐typical good, the foundation
for evaluative judgment may seem to beg the question. For Foot may have given a
foundation for evaluative judgment based not on natural facts, but rather on
explicitly normative ones. Also, even if Foot is able to give some plausible
naturalistic analysis of life form‐typical good, one might still worry whether this
analysis itself is influenced by her prior normative commitments. Foot must find
some objective ground on which to base her claims about life form‐typical good.
And when empirical science has been wholly rejected, this seems a difficult task
indeed.
Unfortunately, Natural Goodness has left it to us to find some plausible
objective understanding of life form‐typical good. In what follows, I will propose
two possibilities. As far as I can tell, these are the best and most likely options. I
will go on to argue that neither of these options can really save Foot’s natural
evaluative judgment. Since I cannot pretend to have imagined every possible
response, I admit that perhaps some better account of objective life‐form typical
good could save Foot. However, I take it that by making explicit what an account of
life form‐typical good would have to be like in order to save natural goodness, I will
be revealing something important. The two options I will consider are: first, a
straightforward understanding of life form‐typical good in terms of success in
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individual development, self‐maintenance, and reproduction; and second, an
understanding founded on Thompson’s ‘definition’ of life form.

Option 1: Life formtypical good= the life cycle= characteristic development, self
maintenance, and reproduction
Foot’s first option is a straightforward one. She might say something like
“since for plants and animals, a life form’s life cycle is its characteristic development,
self maintenance, and reproduction, success in these ventures is success in the life
cycle. And clearly a successful life is good for members of a life form.”35 This would
amount to a definition of life form‐typical good as success in the life cycle, where
what counts as part of the life cycle of a plant or animal is its characteristic survival
and reproduction. In taking this approach, Foot would get what seems to be a
plausible claim—that a successful life is good for a life form. But she would get it at
the cost of sneaking normativity into what was supposed to be a basis in natural
fact.
One might try to cash “success” out in terms of some non‐normative notion.
But clearly, Foot could not have straightforward maximization of reproduction and
longevity in mind as success in a life cycle, since maximal reproduction and
longevity would go beyond a life form’s characteristic activities. The success Foot
would have in mind would have to be relative to the organism’s characteristic life
processes. But even this idea is problematic, since perhaps an organism could find a

Micah Lott goes with an interpretation like this: “The goodness of parts and activities in a living
thing is determined by their role in enabling the organism to realize the characteristic…good of its
kind of life.”

35
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way to increase its reproduction or longevity in a non‐characteristic way. However,
it is unclear that this would be a defect in the organism in every case, as it would
have to be on Foot’s view.36
Since defining life form‐typical good in terms of success seems to defeat the
purpose of providing a non‐normative foundation for natural goodness, perhaps
Foot could give another definition. Another possibility is that Foot means that life
form‐typical good is simply the life form’s life cycle. This avoids the problem of
sneaking some normative notion into the definition. Defining life form‐typical good
as the life cycle is a view somewhat closer to Thompson’s account, as I will discuss
below. However, since Foot holds that the life cycle consists in survival and
reproduction, it is no longer really clear why we should think that survival and
reproduction exhaust the possibilities for life form‐typical good. Foot has not given
an argument ruling out pleasure, to give just one example. And she cannot be
merely stipulating a definition since she relies on the objectivity of the evaluative
claims she reaches through life form‐typical good. It seems then, that the
straightforward definition of life form‐typical good is one of two things: either a
plausible definition that helps itself to normative terms, or a less than plausible
definition that does not. The best way to understand the first step of Foot’s
foundation for evaluative goodness probably is not the straightforward approach I
have just suggested. Next, I will discuss what Foot’s account might amount to if she
relied on the things that Thompson has to say about life forms and good.

36
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Option 2: Life formtypical good= the set of Aristotelian categoricals
As I discussed in Section II, Foot’s account started from Thompson’s
description of the logically distinct form of judgment about life, the Aristotelian
categorical. Because of this, it might seem as though Foot may want to look to
Thompson to define life form‐typical good. For Thompson, life related concepts are
explicated in terms of Aristotelian categoricals. From this point of view, a life form’s
typical good is defined as the set of true Aristotelian categoricals about that life
form. Since, according to Thompson, Aristotelian categoricals are natural facts, Foot
would thus have the objective ground for life form‐typical good that she needs.
Discussing whether or not Thompson’s project is successful would take me
far beyond the scope of this project. So, as interesting as it is, I will set this question
aside. Here, my goal is to show that because of the ways in which Foot’s account
differs from Thompson’s, arguments that may or may not be successful for
Thompson will certainly not work for Foot. In pointing out the places where
Thompson and Foot differ I hope to show that Foot’s natural goodness cannot be
saved by a simple nod in Thompson’s direction.
One possible worry about an appeal to Thompson is that, although Foot
claims to be appealing to natural facts in order to ground evaluative judgment,
Aristotelian categoricals may not turn out to be natural facts on Thompson’s view.37
For Thompson, the notion of a life form is a priori and, therefore, Aristotelian
categoricals constitute a logical form of judgment distinct from the logical form of
Fregean generalizations. One might worry that facts given by two distinct logical
“In any case, the norms that we have been talking about so far have been explained in terms of
facts about things belonging to the natural world.” Foot 36
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forms of judgment cannot both count as natural, especially since the role the a priori
nature of the concept ‘life form’ plays in the characterization of Aristotelian
categoricals is unclear. Specifically, one might wonder about whether particular life
form concepts, such as “domestic cat,” must also be a priori on Thompson’s view.
Although the content expressed by ordinary judgments and Aristotelian categoricals
is the same, according to Thompson, the form of judgment is different. Because of
this, one might think that the kind of fact expressed is therefore different. But since
facts like “pennies are round” and “domestic cats harbor fleas” are paradigmatic
natural facts, it might appear that “domestic cats have four legs,” as an Aristotelian
categorical, is a non‐natural fact. I will not pretend that the appearance is decisive,
however. Nevertheless, I think this might point to some important difference
between the two accounts, and for now I will settle for flagging the potential worry.
If it turns out that on Thompson’s account, Aristotelian categoricals are clear natural
facts, then so much the better for Foot.
Another reason to think that Foot’s reliance on natural facts is a break from
Thompson’s account is that Thompson sometimes talks as though life forms are
concepts we impose on the world, rather than ones we read from it. For example,
Thompson says “I think our question should not be: what is a life‐form, a species, a
psuche?, but: how is such a thing described,”38 and also that the “attempt to produce
a natural history…expresses one’s interpretation or understanding of the life‐form
shared by the members of that class.”39 Foot’s project of grounding evaluative
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judgments in straightforward natural facts is clearly not supported by Thompson’s
emphasis on the logical.
I argued in Section II that Foot’s teleology breaks away from Thompson’s
work in specifying the development, self‐maintenance, and reproduction of
organisms as the ends towards which life processes are aimed. I will take this
argument up again here. First, while Thompson is silent about the range of
Aristotelian categoricals, Foot narrows this range to include only those judgments
having to do directly or indirectly with self‐maintenance, development, and
reproduction. A central example from Foot claims that a blue tit lacking a spot is not
defective because the spot does not contribute to its life cycle.40 But this example
seems in tension with Thompson’s casual mention of the crests of crested birds as
clear parts of their life cycles, since he mentions them without any expectation that
these crests must be useful for survival or reproduction.41 Thompson leaves his
account of life form open to the fact that organisms and their lives can be different
with regard to things other than how they survive and reproduce. In fact,
Thompson seems to reject that survival and reproduction have a special place in the
understanding of living things since he rejects them as criteria for determining
whether something is alive: “It is enough that the thing should exhibit any vital
process or operation—why should reproduction and ‘homeostasis’ in particular be
among them.”42
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Foot also uses Thompson’s account of life form to do work he never intends it
to do. Her account relies on the fact that we can at least make some useful
judgments about how creatures fall under life forms. She discusses examples that
imply that she thinks that deer, peacocks, oaks, and humans each have their own life
form. But Thompson holds that “the thin category [of life form] must leave many
questions of sameness and difference of life form unsettled.”43 An approach such as
Thompson’s, where “it is only by supplying a further, perhaps empirically
warranted, specification of the bare concept of a life form and the form of judgment
in which we represent it, that we can get clear answers to such questions” will not
make a good basis for a teleology that was supposed to be entirely distinct from
empirical questions in biology.44 Foot cannot both accept some help from
evolutionary biology in specifying life forms and, by taking the complementary
approach, claim that her account is entirely distinct. This is a third reason that a nod
to Thompson will fail as an attempt to find a naturalistic definition of life form‐
typical good.
Since he thinks that the life form he has ‘defined’ is such a thin concept,
Thompson himself expresses worries about arguments to ground evaluation
directly in them. He claims that we may get a standard for natural goodness and
defect from Aristotelian categoricals, but that45
this conception is so unnaturally broad that it would take in, say, losing aspects of an
individual creature’s environment. It is rather a notion of something’s being wrong in
connection with the organism than the narrower notion of something’s being wrong with it.
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I have argued that Foot must find some positive account of life form‐typical
good that is both objective and natural in order to be said to successfully ground
evaluative judgment in natural fact. Appeal to Thompson’s definition of life form
cannot serve as the robust kind of basis that Foot needs since her account has made
claims that are inconsistent with Thompson’s theory. Since Thompson focuses on
the logical form of Aristotelian categoricals and does not specify self‐maintenance
and reproduction as the ultimate ends of the features of organisms, Foot cannot rely
on his account of life form‐typical good.
I have argued in this section that the complementary approach cannot save
Foot’s natural goodness. First, I gave reasons to think that Foot would probably take
the complementary approach over the exclusive approach. If she takes the
complementary approach, Foot can unproblematically reach notions of evaluative
goodness starting from life form‐typical good. The worry is that she cannot give an
adequate account of life form‐typical good.
I considered two possible ways that Foot could understand life form‐typical
good. The first seemed straightforward, but it turned out that this account yielded
either an implausible definition or one that explicitly relied on a normative notion.
The second possibility I suggested was using Thompson’s analysis of life form to
find a definition of life form‐typical good. But Thompson’s analysis will not work
because Foot’s account of life form departs from Thompson’s in important ways. In
this section, I have not been able to find a solution to the problems for the
complementary approach, despite my best efforts. In fact, a satisfying solution to
the problem of defining life form‐typical good does not seem likely. Thus, I have
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argued that Foot’s natural teleology fails when taken as a rival to teleological
concepts informed by evolutionary biology as well as when it is taken as a distinct
theory completely compatible with an evolutionary account of teleology. The
complementary approach, it seems, cannot save Foot’s natural foundation for
evaluative goodness.

VI. Conclusion
In Natural Goodness, Philippa Foot aims to give an account of goodness and
badness in action by showing that it is a subset of the natural goodness that depends
on the relation of an individual to its life form. Foot argues that moral evaluation
and the evaluation of nonhuman organisms in relation to their life forms share a
logical structure. First she gives an account of natural goodness and defect as it
relates to plants and nonhuman animals. Then she extends this account to human
action, claiming that the only difference between the account of evaluation of
nonhuman organisms and humans is that for humans, their life cycles include
practical rationality as a central part.
Here, I have argued that Foot’s account of natural goodness fails as an
attempt to ground the evaluation of living things in natural fact, even before its
extension to moral evaluation. Foot’s project depends on her characterization of a
life form and of the life cycles of organisms. Since Foot does not supply a principled
explanation of the life form and life cycle in Natural Goodness, her account of natural
evaluation could perhaps support almost any claims about goodness and badness. I
have attempted to provide some interpretations of what Foot likely had in mind in
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relying on the life cycles of organisms, in order to find whether these interpretations
yield theories compatible with her characterization of moral evaluation. Since the
life cycle is the foundation of her argument, Foot must have something to say about
the activities that count as a life form’s life cycle.
Foot provides an account of life cycles in terms of a theory of biological
teleology. Foot’s account of biological teleology holds that the features and
behaviors of nonhuman organisms are all aimed at the ends of characteristic
development, self‐maintenance, and reproduction, but there are alternative theories
of biological teleology concerned with evolution.46 From the evolutionary
perspective, germ‐line gene replication is the end towards which the functions of
living things are aimed. Foot rejects evolutionarily informed teleology.
I have argued that Foot’s account of teleology faces a dilemma. She may
either take the exclusive approach or the complementary approach. I have found
that the exclusive approach fails on biological grounds. First, Foot’s teleology
cannot distinguish the genuine ends of features of organisms from mere effects. I
have discussed some biological examples, including the dominance hierarchies in
elephant seals, parasitic flukes in snails, and the clutch size of swifts in resource‐
deprived environments. Another argument against the exclusive approach is that
Foot’s teleology arbitrarily focuses on just some of the available teleological facts.
Since, it is argued, evolutionarily informed teleological theories can explain all of the
teleological facts, they are preferable to Foot’s.
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Against the complementary approach, I have focused on worries about the
ways Foot might understand the life form and life cycle if her teleology is not taken
as a theory drawing on empirical science. I suggested two options and argued that
neither can save Foot’s bridge between natural goodness and natural fact. The first
option is to understand life form‐typical good as either the life cycle itself, or as
success in the life cycle. This option fails because it either relies on something
explicitly normative or on an unacceptable assumption about what is an organism’s
good. The second option I have considered is that Foot looks to Thompson to give
an account of life form‐typical good. I have suggested that this option fails because
Foot has made claims that reach beyond Thompson’s account in crucial ways. I have
argued that these extensions make Thompson’s analysis of life form incompatible
with Foot’s understanding of natural goodness. Some of these arguments depended
on a particular worry for Thompson, namely that he must think that particular life
form concepts are non‐empirical. Unfortunately, I was unable in this work to delve
deeper into this problem, and I have left it for the future to reach a final verdict
along these lines. However the details of the differences between Thompson’s and
Foot’s account turn out, the main idea seems clear enough: Foot’s account attempts
to do more than Thompson’s does, and is thus on shakier ground.
Neither an exclusive approach nor a complementary approach seem to yield
a theory of teleology sufficient for defending Foot’s claims about the basis of natural
evaluation. Since her investigation fails even before it is extended to discuss the
vastly more complicated case of the evaluation of human action, the worry runs all
the way to Foot’s account of moral evaluation. I argued that the notion of a life form
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and that of a characteristic life cycle are the crucial elements in Foot’s theory. I have
found that, under any interpretation, these concepts cannot do the work that Foot’s
account of natural goodness requires. In my opinion, Foot’s attempt to bridge the
gulf between natural facts and moral ones has not quite succeeded.
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